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Zusammenfassung: Das Diskriminierungsverbot ist zwar 
ein wichtiger Grundsatz in der Europäischen Union (EU), 
über seine Auswirkungen innerhalb der Mitgliedsstaaten 
ist bisher allerdings wenig bekannt. Wir gehen davon aus, 
dass das Diskriminierungsverbot das Ausmaß von Lohn-
diskriminierung gegen EU-Ausländer auf den nationalen 
Arbeitsmärkten in der EU verringert. Diese Vermutung 
wird mit administrativen Prozessdaten überprüft, indem 
die Veränderungen von Lohnunterschieden zwischen 
vollzeitbeschäftigten deutschen und ausländischen Män-
nern auf dem westdeutschen Arbeitsmarkt mit Juhn-Mur-
phy-Pierce-Zerlegungen analysiert werden. Die Ergebnisse 
stützen die Hypothese: Während die Lohndiskriminierung 
für die meisten untersuchten Gruppen von EU-Ausländern 
nach dem Beitritt ihrer Herkunftsländer zurückgegan-
gen ist, lässt sich für die meisten Ausländergruppen aus 
Drittstaaten gestiegene oder konstante Lohndiskrimi-
nierung beobachten. Die europäischen Nichtdiskrimi-
nierungsregeln und die mit ihnen verbundenen Übertra-
gungsmechanismen wirken demnach in die intendierte 
Richtung.
Schlagworte: Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit; Arbeitsmarkt; 
Europäische Integration; Diskriminierung; Migration; 
Lohnunterschiede; Politische Soziologie; Europasoziolo-
gie; Zerlegung
Summary: The prohibition of all types of discrimination is 
one of the tenets of the European Union (EU), but we know 
little about their effects in EU member states. Our hypoth-
esis is that such regulations prevent within-job wage dis-
crimination against EU foreigners in national labor mar-
kets. We test this assumption by decomposing changes in 
wage differences between German male employees and 
foreigners in the West German labor market by applying 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions on administrative 
data. The findings generally support our hypothesis. 
While wage discrimination decreased for most groups of 
EU foreigners and for most rounds of EU enlargement, it 
rose for most groups of third-country nationals. We con-
clude that EU anti-discrimination provisions and case law 
ensuring free movement mitigate wage discrimination 
against EU foreigners in the German labor market. 
Keywords: Decomposition; Discrimination; European In-
tegration; Free Movement of Workers; Labor Market; Mi-
gration; Political Sociology; Sociology of Europe; Wage 
Gap.
1  Introduction
One of the tenets of the European Union (EU) is the ban 
on all types of discrimination. This principle has been de-
veloped in distinct policy areas such as equal pay for men 
and women and the prohibition of discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality (Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU), art. 18 and 157, Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU, art. 21). Most elaborately and probably most 
consequentially, non-discrimination has been implement-
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ed in the area of freedom of movement. With regard to em-
ployment, EU foreigners are on equal terms with nationals 
in all EU member states. They have the right to move free-
ly within the Union’s territory to search and compete for 
as well as accept jobs. The EU treaties prohibit all types 
of discrimination related to this economic freedom, and 
they explicitly mention the aspects of employment, remu-
neration, and other conditions of work and employment 
(TFEU, art. 45). 
Despite the centrality of these regulations to Europe-
an integration, we know little about their influence on dis-
criminatory practices. This lack of knowledge is even more 
astounding because in the US context, anti-discrimina-
tion provisions have sparked sustained scientific interest, 
particularly with regard to women and ethnic minorities 
(e.g. Darity & Mason 1998; Dobbin et al. 1993; Donohue & 
Heckman 1991; Tomaskovic-Devey & Stainback 2007). The 
accession of new countries to the EU best illustrates the 
relevance of non-discrimination regulations. By chang-
ing in status from third-country nationals to EU citizens, 
people from accessing countries enjoy equal rights within 
national labor markets throughout the EU. Thus, they are 
de facto naturalized in their host countries with regard to 
labor market participation.
Our hypothesis is that the EU anti-discrimination 
provisions regarding free movement reduce wage discrim-
ination against EU foreigners in national labor markets. 
Wage discrimination prevails if foreigners with equal 
qualifications or equal productivity earn lower wages than 
natives due to their nationality (Petersen & Saporta 2004: 
858). Empirically, we test this assumption by analyzing 
changes in wage differentials between male Germans and 
foreigners in the West German labor market by applying 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions (Juhn et al. 1991) to 
administrative data. 
2  Discrimination in labor markets
Our study links conceptually, empirically, and methodo-
logically to previous research on discrimination in labor 
markets. Conceptually, Becker’s (1971) theory of discrimi-
nation is an early milestone. He concentrates on whether 
employers’ tastes for discrimination impair the survival 
of their firms in competitive markets. Other approaches 
focus on the role of incomplete information and stereo-
types in individual rationales (Aigner & Cain 1977; Phelps 
1972), or they emphasize the structural and cultural pro-
cesses of discrimination that are located beyond individ-
uals (Achatz et al. 2005; Dovidio et al. 2010; England et 
al. 2002). Recent research scrutinizes the contextual and 
interactive dynamics that shape discrimination by point-
ing to the need to redirect attention from motives to mech-
anisms that specify “how people come to be stratified on 
the basis of their ascribed characteristics” (Reskin 2003: 
2). This research includes examining the mechanisms of 
discrimination on lower levels of abstraction than in eco-
nomic theories. In line with this stream of literature, Pager 
et al. (2009) argue that tastes for discrimination are not 
fixed and confined to a few employers but are, in fact, 
“more interactive, contextual, and widespread” (Pager et 
al. 2009: 779). Others investigate how opportunity struc-
tures shape the possibility of turning a preference for 
discrimination into discriminatory action (Bielby 2000; 
Midtboen 2014; Petersen & Saporta 2004). Organizations 
prove to be important intermediaries because they adopt 
legislative and normative prescriptions and translate them 
into organizational routines and practices that shape indi-
viduals’ room to maneuver (Dobbin & Sutton 1998; Hirsh 
2009; Tomaskovic-Devey & Stainback 2007). Drawing on 
this research, we identify mechanisms that show how the 
EU anti-discrimination provisions impact discriminatory 
practices against EU foreigners.
Empirically, there is mixed evidence on discrimina-
tion in labor markets. While some studies identify dis-
crimination as a factor that structures labor market out-
comes (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004; Darity & Mason 
1998; Donohue & Heckman 1991; Midtboen 2014), others 
are more hesitant (Evans & Kelley 1991; Kalter & Granato 
2002; Wanner 1998; Verwiebe et al. 2003) or come to dif-
ferentiated conclusions (Petersen & Saporta 2004). Repre-
sentative of the second group, Evans & Kelley (1991) find 
practically no hints of discrimination in the jobs and pay 
of immigrants in Australia. While some employers admit 
discriminatory hiring practices, this does not translate into 
relevant economic disadvantages. In contrast, Bertrand & 
Mullainathan (2004) present substantial evidence of dis-
crimination against ethnic minorities. In an experimental 
study, they send fictitious applications with white- and 
black-sounding names in response to job advertisements 
in two American cities and find that applications with 
white-sounding names receive 50 percent more invitations 
to job interviews. Other quasi-experimental and audit 
studies find disadvantages for minorities or migrants in 
other cities and countries (Kaas & Manger 2011; Midtboen 
2014; Pager et al. 2009). Such findings reinforce interest 
in political interventions against discrimination. Research 
has particularly focused on equal opportunity law and its 
impact on blacks, Latinos and women (Dobbin et al. 1993; 
Donohue & Heckman 1991). Our study follows this line of 
research. It is the first to investigate the impact of EU an-
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ti-discrimination provisions on wage discrimination in an 
EU member state’s labor market using micro data. 
The debate on the relevance of labor market discrim-
ination has a methodological dimension. As an illegiti-
mate practice, discrimination is notoriously difficult to 
measure. Empirical studies approach discrimination us-
ing more or less direct measures (Darity & Mason 1998). 
Indirect measures such as regression models and wage de-
compositions observe the outcomes of discrimination as 
group differences (e.g. between migrants and residents). 
These findings have the drawback that the differences 
may be caused by unobserved variables (see, for instance, 
Cancio et al. 1996). Direct measures such as audit stud-
ies (Goldin & Rouse 2000) or quasi-experimental designs 
minimize the (potential) confounding impact of unob-
served heterogeneity. However, they are often empirically 
limited to certain regions or cities and certain labor mar-
ket segments (see, for instance, Midtboen 2014) and direct 
measures cannot be used for past periods. Thus, research-
ers face a methodological dilemma: Either they revert to 
indirect measures that may be confounded by unobserved 
variables or they use direct measures of limited scope. 
In our study, we decompose changes in wage differ-
ences between foreigners and Germans as an indirect 
measure of wage discrimination. We address the problems 
of indirect measurement first by analyzing exceptionally 
rich administrative data to minimize the potential impact 
of unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we apply Juhn-Mur-
phy-Pierce (1991) decompositions that allow interpreta-
tions of the changes in wage discrimination over time and 
that are, in our case, robust with regard to different defi-
nitions of wage discrimination. Furthermore, we include 
non-EU countries in our analysis to be able to ascribe the 
observed developments to EU anti-discrimination provi-
sions. 
3  Background, mechanisms, and 
hypothesis
Freedom of movement for workers is one of four economic 
freedoms that constitute the backbone of European inte-
gration. The founders of what would become the EU hoped 
that market integration would bring Europeans closer 
together and open a “future of an ever closer” political 
and societal integration (Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, 
1957). Nation states were to integrate into a liberal Euro-
pean order that is centered on ideas such as free trade, 
market competition, and individual freedom (Münch 
2010). The European provisions and the ensuing case 
law on economic freedom concentrate on cross-border 
issues such as intra-EU trade or the provision of services 
throughout the Union. In line with these provisions, free 
movement (TFEU, art. 45) protects Europeans that cross 
borders to work in a different member state of the EU. Free 
movement is designed to foster fair competition between 
nationals and EU foreigners in labor markets throughout 
the EU, and it prohibits all types of discrimination against 
EU foreigners regarding employment, remuneration, and 
other conditions of work and employment. Over the dec-
ades, the European Court of Justice has substantiated and 
widened the individual claims deriving from the article in 
case law (Oliviera 2002). As a consequence, EU foreigners 
are on equal footing with nationals in regard to employ-
ment in the host country. They effectively become co-na-
tionals in the area of labor market rights. Their status is 
privileged vis-à-vis that of other foreigners (third-country 
nationals) who do not enjoy freedom of movement and the 
related anti-discrimination rights.
We want to know whether these EU provisions actual-
ly reduce wage discrimination between nationals and EU 
foreigners. It is important to note that legal provisions and 
law enforcement do not automatically change existing 
practices. Rather, they have to be recognized and incorpo-
rated – sometimes against resistance – before they trans-
late into individual and organizational practices (Tomask-
ovic-Devey & Stainback 2007). For this reason, we wish 
to determine the mechanisms that change discriminatory 
practices against EU foreigners in their host countries’ la-
bor markets. We identify two such mechanisms: 
First, one can distinguish between direct and indirect 
effects of anti-discrimination provisions (Hirsh 2009). 
Direct effects of law enforcement come from discrimina-
tion charges and affect only those establishments that are 
prosecuted. Indirect effects of law enforcement affect es-
tablishments in the vicinity of the charged establishment, 
i.e. those that are located in the same organizational field 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Tomaskovic-Devey & Stainback 
2007). In such organizational fields, discrimination charg-
es establish “a culture of compliance that draws attention 
to sex and race equity, renders discrimination norma-
tively unacceptable, and communicates what constitutes 
fair employment” (Hirsh 2009: 246). In a similar manner, 
EU anti-discrimination provisions on free movement and 
the ensuing case law exert direct and indirect pressure to 
compliance in member states’ labor markets. They render 
wage discrimination against EU foreigners normative-
ly unacceptable and stipulate changes in organizational 
practices that reduce the opportunity structure for wage 
discrimination. This mechanism improves the situation of 
EU foreigners in European labor markets either by impact-
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ing employers’ taste for discrimination (Becker 1971) or by 
changing organizational practices in such a way that the 
opportunity structure for discrimination is reduced (Dob-
bin et al. 1993; Pager et al. 2009). 
Second, tastes for discrimination presuppose distinc-
tions between in-groups and out-groups. Such distinctions 
lead to out-group derogation and/or to in-group favoritism, 
which in turn may motivate the differential treatment of 
in- and out-groups – in particular, discrimination against 
out-groups (Dovidio et al. 2010). Thus, the second mecha-
nism that reinforces the EU anti-discrimination provisions 
on free movement builds on these social-psychological 
processes. Surveys show that EU integration has reshaped 
the boundaries between in- and out-groups in member 
states (Eurobarometer 2014). Throughout the EU, people 
from other EU countries are privileged over third-country 
nationals. In the German case, half of the German respond-
ents appreciate migration from other EU countries. By con-
trast, approval of migration from outside the EU is much 
lower (29 percent). Societal processes of transnational in-
tegration maintain differences between EU foreigners and 
third-country nationals (Fligstein 2008; Mau 2010). With the 
accession of their countries of origin to the EU, people from 
accessing countries become members of the EU in-group. 
As a consequence of their status passage from third-coun-
try nationals to EU citizens, they profit from EU in-group 
favoritism and suffer less from out-group prejudice against 
third-country nationals. Hence, nationals are less inclined 
to discriminate against them due to their nationality. 
These mechanisms contribute to the impact of EU an-
ti-discrimination provisions deriving from free movement 
in national labor markets. We conclude that access to the 
EU positively influences the prevention of wage discrimi-
nation against new EU citizens. In other words:
Our hypothesis is that EU anti-discrimination provisions on free 
movement reduce wage discrimination against EU foreigners in 
national labor markets.
We expect reductions in wage discrimination to be rather 
slow because preferences for discrimination and organiza-
tional practices are resistant to change and do not become 
effective unless there are wage bargains, promotions or 
changes in jobs or positions. 
4  Data and Method
We use three administrative datasets provided by the 
German Institute for Employment Research.1 (1) The Em-
ployee History (BeH V08.06) consists of information from 
the registration for social security contributions. The data 
contain daily information on employees such as their 
gross daily wages, occupation, industry, a dummy for full-
time or part-time work, and socio-demographic charac-
teristics such as date of birth, sex, nationality, and qual-
ifications. The data do not include information on civil 
servants or self-employed persons. (2) The Benefit Receipt 
History SGB III (LeH V6.07) consists of daily person-relat-
ed data on the receipt of unemployment benefits. (3) The 
Establishment History Panel (BHP7510) includes exten-
sive cross-sectional data on establishment characteristics 
that are aggregated from individual social security noti-
fications. The dataset contains the basic characteristics 
of establishments such as the number of employees, the 
founding date, and the structure of employees on June 30 
of each year.
We restrict our population of interest to men who are 
employed full-time in West Germany and are between 15 
and 57 years old. We only consider employment that is 
subject to social security contributions each June 30 be-
tween 1980 and 2010. The gross daily earnings of full-time 
employments have to be higher than the limit for marginal 
part-time work as defined by law, which was 400 euros 
in 2010. We limit the sample to full-time employment be-
cause only gross daily earnings are reported, and we do not 
have any information on hours worked, but rather a full-
time/part-time dummy. We exclude female employees be-
cause of their preference for part-time work (Hakim 2000). 
Such gender-specific preferences are particularly strong 
in conservative welfare states such as Germany that still 
adhere to the male breadwinner model (Esping-Andersen 
1990). In fact, 35 percent of employed women with social 
insurance work part-time in Germany (as of June 30, 2010, 
Federal Employment Agency). For that reason, we expect 
biased results since wage gap decompositions of female 
full-time employment do not take selection into full-time 
employment into account (Heckman 1979). We exclude 
employment in East Germany to ensure that the results are 
not confounded by persistant wage differences between 
East and West Germany (Smolny & Kirbach 2011). This ex-
1 A detailed description of the data sources is provided by Dorner 
et al. (2010) and Gruhl et al. (2012). The Research Data Centre of the 
Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Re-
search provides a 2 percent sample of the datasets on individuals and 
a 50 percent sample of the establishment dataset for academic use.
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emption affects only a small share of foreigners because 
93.3 percent of employed foreigners work in West Germany 
(as of June 30, 2010, Federal Employment Agency). 
After selecting the employments, we draw a dispro-
portionate stratified random sample with sampling frac-
tions that differ by nationality (Table 1). The sample size 
takes into account the total number of foreigners from 
each country of origin in the German labor market. We 
chose higher sampling fractions for smaller groups of em-
ployees on the German labor market. 
The final dataset for the analysis contains 2,135,892 
employments on each June 30 from 1980 to 2010. Table 2 
provides an overview of all of the variables. Tables A1 and 
A2 in the appendix contain descriptive statistics.
The Employee History contains censored wages at the 
upper limit for social security contributions, e.g. if in 2010, 
the monthly gross wage is 3,750 euros, we only know that 
the true value is equal to or greater than this limit. We im-
pute wages beyond the limit for social security contribu-
tions by estimating tobit regressions and adding random 
Tab. 1: Sampling fractions per nationality
Sampling fraction  
in %
Nationalities
100 Finland, Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Norway, Belarus
70 Switzerland
50 Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Morocco, Vietnam
30 USA, Iraq, China
15 Portugal, Ukraine
10 Austria, Spain, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russian Federation, Albania
5 Greece
3 Italy, Poland, Macedonia
1 Turkey
0,1 Germany
Tab. 2: Measurement concepts of the dependent variable and all observed characteristics for the explained part of the wage gap
Variable  
(data source)
Measurement concept
log wage  
(Employee History)
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the gross daily wage on June 30 in 2008 prices.
nationality  
(Employee History)
We separately compute Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions for each foreigner group. Nationality as a 
time-varying variable can change at the beginning of every new job or at the end of any year within a 
continuing job. 
age  
(Employee History)
We use linear and quadratic terms of age, measured in years.
federal state  
(Employee History)
Nine dummy variables capture the federal state: Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Rhineland-Palat-
inate, Saarland, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein.
vocational education  
(Employee History)
Three dummies capture the level of vocational education, including one missing dummy: no vocational 
education, vocational education, university degree, missing.
higher education  
(Employee History)
A dummy captures a higher education entrance qualification for university (A-level).
labor market entry  
(Employee History)
As we have information on individuals’ whole employment history in the German labor market, we 
differentiate five temporal categories since first appearance in the German labor market: <1 year, >=1 
and <2 years, >=2 and <3 years, >=3 and <4 years, >=4 years.
employment history  
(Employee History)
We differentiate five categories of cumulated duration of employment in Germany during the last 5 ½ 
years. Interrupted and part-time employment is included: <½ year, >=½ and <1 year, >=1 and <2 years, 
>=2 and <5 years, >=5 years.
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Variable  
(data source)
Measurement concept
tenure  
(Employee History)
We differentiate five categories of cumulated duration within the current employment during the last 
5 ½ years. Part-time employment is included: <½ year, >=½ and <1 year, >=1 and <2 years, >=2 and 
<5 years, >=5 years.
unemployment history 
(Unemployment History)
We differentiate four categories of cumulated duration of unemployment benefit receipts in Germany 
during the last 5 ½ years: 0 years, >0 and <½ year, >=½ and <1 year, >=1 year. Receipt of unemployment 
benefits requires previous employment within the social security insurance system.
occupation  
(Employee History)
We use the classification of occupations developed by Blossfeld 1987: agricultural occupations, 
unskilled manual occupations, skilled manual occupations, technicians, engineers, unskilled services, 
skilled services, (semi-) professions, unskilled commercial and administrational occupations, skilled 
commercial and administrational occupations, managers, missing.
industry  
(Employee History)
We use the industry code according to the classification of economic activities (edition 1993) from the 
German Federal Statistical Office: agriculture/hunting/forestry/fishing, mining/quarrying, manufactur-
ing, electricity/gas/water supply, construction, wholesale/retail/trade/repair of motor vehicles/motor-
cycles/personal/household goods, hotels/restaurants, transport/storage/communication, financial 
intermediation, real estate/renting/business activities, public administration/defense/compulsory 
social security, education, health/social work, other community/social/personal service activities/
private households with employed persons, extra-territorial organizations and bodies, missing.
establishment size  
(Establishment History Panel)
The number of employees is divided into six categories, including one for missing: 1, 2 to 9, 10 to 49, 50 
to 249, 250 or more, missing.
well-established firm  
(Establishment History Panel)
We included a dummy that equals 1 if an establishment has existed for 5 years or longer.
structure of employees within 
the establishment  
(Establishment History Panel)
We included several dummies for a high proportion of women (dummy on median), a high share of 
full-time employees (dummy on median), a high share of employees without vocational education 
(dummy on median), a high share of employees with middle vocational education (dummy on median), 
a high share of highly qualified employees (dummy on median), a high share of employees with missing 
information on education (dummy on the 90 % quantile), a high share of employees with German 
nationality (dummy on median), and a high share of engineers and natural scientists as a proxy for large 
research and development departments within establishments (dummy on the 90 % quantile).
unemployment rate Yearly average unemployment rate within the district where the establishment is located is derived from 
the Federal Employment Agency.
regional type The population density and regional type is based on the classification of districts developed by the 
German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs, and Spatial Development. On the 
district level, we differentiate between agglomeration areas, urbanized areas, and rural areas.
dummies per year  
(Employee History)
Dummies capture the year of employment between 1980 and 2010.
Tab. 3: Entry to EU and first decomposition period
Entry to the EU Countries Period 1
1952 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland (founding members) –
1973 Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain/Northern Ireland –
1981 Greece 1980
1986 Portugal, Spain 1982–1985
1995 Austria, Sweden, Finland 1991–1994
2004 Malta, Cyprus –
2004 Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia 2000–2003
2007 Romania, Bulgaria 2003–2006
2013 Croatia –
Note: The second decomposition period is 2007–2010.
Tab. 2 (continued)
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noise from a truncated normal distribution to the predict-
ed values (Gartner 2005; Hinz & Gartner 2005). 
The datasets that we use provide several benefits: 
First, we use an exceptionally rich dataset that includes 
linked employer-employee data as well as individual data 
on (un-) employment histories, which allows us to focus 
on within-job wage discrimination and in addition allows 
us to control for individual histories of employment and 
unemployment. Second, the administrative data cover all 
employees who are subject to social insurance contribu-
tions in Germany between 1975 and 2010, thus allowing 
the full inclusion of smaller groups of EU foreigners and 
an analysis of the stepwise EU integration process that has 
continued over several decades (Table 3). Third, the Estab-
lishment History Panel includes information on establish-
ment characteristics that could not have been collected 
from a survey of individuals. Finally, with respect to the 
dependent variable, the data rely on employers to report 
wages to social insurance. Hence, in contrast to surveys, 
administrative data are not compromised by participant 
selectivity or biased answers (Kim & Tamborini 2014). 
We disentangle the effect of changes in the foreigner 
wage gap using the formal wage decomposition developed 
by Juhn et al. (1991). This decomposition method is an ex-
tension of widely used decompositions (i.e. Blinder 1973; 
Oaxaca 1973) that decompose the raw difference in mean 
wages between two groups at a particular point in time to 
an explained part that is due to differences in observed 
characteristics and an unexplained part that may be pos-
itive (wage premium) or negative (wage discrimination). 
In addition, the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition meth-
od allows us to analyze changes in wage gaps such as the 
change in the black-white wage gap (Juhn et al. 1991) or 
trends in the gender wage differential (Blau & Kahn 1997, 
2000; Cha & Weeden 2014). 
We assume that wage discrimination or wage premi-
ums are absent if a foreigner with a certain set of observed 
characteristics earns as much as a German with the same 
set of observed characteristics. Let yit be the logarithm of 
the gross daily wage for individual i at period t defined as
 y  it  =  x  it   b  t  +  σ  t   θ  it 
where x is a vector of independent variables, b is a vector 
of coefficients, σ is the standard deviation of the residuals 
and θ is the vector of standardized residuals. Given two 
periods t=1 and t=2, the difference in the foreigner wage 
gap can be decomposed as the change in the explained 
gap ∆E and the change in the unexplained gap ∆U (Blau & 
Kahn 1997; Jann 2005): 
 ∆E =  (∆  x  2  − ∆  x  1 )   b  1  + ∆  x  2 ( b  2  −  b  1 ) 
 ∆U =  (∆  θ  2  − ∆  θ  1 )   σ  1  + ∆  θ  2 ( σ  2  −  σ  1 ) 
where both first parts on the right-hand side of the equa-
tions present the quantity effects and each second term is 
a price effect.
The change in the explained wage gap due to observed 
characteristics ∆E) is disentangled into quantity and price 
effects. The explained quantity effect is due to changes in 
the composition of observed characteristics, i.e. changing 
differences in observables between foreigners and Ger-
mans. For example, supposing that foreigners have lower 
vocational education levels within the first period, a de-
clining gap in vocational education between foreign and 
German employees would decrease the foreigner-German 
wage gap as an explained quantity effect. The explained 
price effect measures changes in the remuneration of each 
observed characteristic as indexed by German employees. 
For example, supposing that foreigners have lower voca-
tional education levels within both periods, a rising rate of 
German employees’ return to vocational education would 
give the foreigners’ deficit more weight and raise the wage 
gap as an explained price effect.
Likewise, the change in the unexplained part of the 
wage gap ∆U is disentangled into quantity and price ef-
fects. The unexplained quantity effect measures the chang-
ing differences between German and foreigners in relative 
wage positions after controlling for observed characteris-
tics, i.e. whether foreigners rank higher or lower within the 
German residual wage distribution because of unobserved 
characteristics. The unexplained price effect is a measure 
of the changes in Germans’ residual wage distribution if 
foreigners’ percentile rankings in this distribution had not 
changed, i.e. changing returns to unobserved character-
istics. 
Both quantity effects refer to changing differences in 
the composition of observed and unobserved characteris-
tics. Both price effects refer to the wage structure as chang-
ing returns to observed and unobserved characteristics. 
The sum of the unexplained price and the unexplained 
quantity effect describes the change in wage discrimina-
tion or wage premiums. 
The stepwise EU integration process (Table 3) and a 
maximum observation window between 1980 and 2010 re-
strict our analysis to five rounds of enlargement between 
1981 and 2007. We exclude workers from Malta and Cyprus 
due to small group sizes. We use two four-year periods to 
decompose wage differentials and maximize the interval 
between both periods because we expect that the change 
in wage discrimination is a slow process (see section 3). 
For this reason, the second period for all of the decomposi-
64   Stefan Bernhard, Sarah Bernhard, Do EU Anti-discrimination Provisions Make a Difference?
tions is the end of our observation window, i.e. 2007–2010, 
and the first period is the four-year period immediately 
prior to accession. In the case of Greece, our observation 
window prevents such a comparison; hence, we choose 
the first possible year. Throughout the analysis, we com-
pare the wages of Germans to the wages of foreigners, not 
to the wages of migrants or naturalized foreign employees 
because the EU anti-discrimination rights deriving from 
free movement are attached to nationality and not to mi-
gration status.
We take several precautions to bolster our analysis 
and findings. First, to see whether improvements in wage 
discrimination are specific to EU foreigners and do not 
simply reproduce a general trend for foreigners, we com-
pare changes in wage discrimination against EU foreigners 
to changes in wage discrimination against foreigners from 
non-EU countries (Table 4). The following considerations 
guide our selection of comparison countries: (a) We in-
clude countries that are relatively similar to the accession 
countries in terms of geographical proximity to the EU, 
culture, and economic strength. On these grounds we use, 
for example, Norway as a comparison for the Northern En-
largement in 1995 or Croatia and Albania as comparisons 
for the two Eastern Enlargements. (b) We further include 
countries that are dissimilar to the accession countries 
to get fuller picture of relevant labor market trends for 
non-Germans. On these grounds we use, for example, Vi-
etnam as a comparison for the second Southern Enlarge-
ment and China as a comparison for the two Eastern En-
largements. In both cases, we prefer comparison countries 
with larger overall numbers of employees on the German 
labor market. (c) Our choice of comparison countries and 
time periods is limited by the dissolution and new forma-
tion of states after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We cannot 
trace nationals from the former Soviet Union and Yugosla-
via after 1991. To give an example, Belarus cannot be used 
as a comparison for the second Southern Enlargement. 
What is more, some employers reported old nationalities 
for several years after the foundation of new states (e.g. 
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia). Thus, 
our observation windows start in 1999 for workers from 
Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.
Tab. 4: Comparison countries per round of EU enlargement  
EU enlarge-
ment
Comparison countries 
1981 Morocco, Turkey
1986 Morocco, Turkey, Vietnam
1995 Norway, Switzerland, USA
2004 and 
2007
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, 
Croatia, Iraq, Macedonia, Morocco, Russian 
Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam
Second, we estimate a 1-sided Fisher’s exact test and a Wil-
coxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test on the association be-
tween country of origin (EU country/comparison country) 
and changes in unexplained wage gaps between period 1 
and period 2, which result from the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce 
decompositions (column K of table 5). Both tests confirm 
our interpretation of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompo-
sitions. They indicate that changes in unexplained wage 
gaps are different between EU foreigners and third country 
nationals and that EU foreigners tend to have more advan-
tageous changes in unexplained wage gaps than foreign-
ers from the comparison countries (appendix, Table A3). 
Third, we perform robustness checks with reduced 
sets of observed variables to approximate wider defini-
tions of wage discrimination (appendix, Table A4, A5). We 
also perform a robustness check on the choice of the com-
parison periods. We replace the fixed second period (2007–
210) with a flexible second period that covers the first four 
years after accession to the EU (appendix, Table A6). The 
decompositions show the same trends, i.e. declining wage 
discrimination against most EU foreigners and increasing 
wage discrimination against most third-country nation-
als.2 The test statistics further suggest an association be-
tween changes in unexplained wage gaps and country of 
origin for all specifications (appendix, Table A3). Thus, the 
findings are robust to different definitions of within-job 
wage discrimination and the choice of the second period. 
Fourth, as mentioned above, decompositions are in-
direct measures of wage discrimination that are prone to 
bias due to unobserved heterogeneity such as motivation 
or cognitive skills (Wellington 1994; Cancio et al. 1996). 
However, recent research finds a correlation between 
labor market history and such usually unobserved vari-
ables as personality traits, attitudes, expectations, and 
job search behavior (Caliendo et al. 2014). Because our 
2 Estimated changes in the unexplained wage gaps are comparative-
ly smaller with the flexible second period than with the fixed second 
period. This is in line with our argument that changes in wage dis-
crimination take time (see section 3).
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analysis includes (un-) employment histories in Germany 
(Table 2), it is very unlikely that unobserved heterogene-
ity substantially distorts our results. Finally, changes in 
language proficiency could be another factor that drives 
decreases in wage discrimination. To control for this fac-
tor, we included several dummies that control for the time 
since an individual’s first day in the German labor market 
(labor market entry, Table 2). Thus, we can ascertain that 
an individual had sufficient language proficiency to ob-
tain a job and we know how much time has passed since 
labor market entry. We assume this time to be positively 
correlated with language proficiency (Lehmer & Ludsteck 
2014).
5  Results and discussion
Table 5 shows the wage decompositions from five rounds 
of EU enlargements. As the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decom-
positions are based on regressions of log daily wages that 
provide results in log points, we transformed all of the 
results with (exp(result)-1)(-1) for better readability and 
interpretation.3 After this transformation, columns A to F 
contain wage differences between Germans and foreign-
ers (in percent/100). Positive values indicate higher mean 
wages of foreigners in comparison to Germans and vice 
versa. Columns G to M contain wage differences between 
the two periods (in percentage points/100). A minus sign 
indicates changes in wage differences to the disadvantage 
of the respective group of non-natives and vice versa. 
We start (a) with a description of the decomposed 
wage gaps of (future) EU nationals in the period immedi-
ately prior to the accession of their home country to the 
EU, as can be found in columns A to C of table 5. This is 
followed by (b) a description of wage gaps in the period 
from 2007 to 2010 (columns D to F) and the changes in 
the wage gaps ever since the accession to the EU (columns 
G to M). We conclude (c) by looking at changes in wage 
discrimination against EU citizens (column K, bold typed 
countries) and (d) against foreigners from the comparison 
countries (column K, non-bold). 
(a) The wage and labor market characteristics of EU 
foreigners on the German labor market vary with the coun-
tries of origin (St. Bernhard & Sa. Bernhard 2014; Verwiebe 
et al. 2003). Prior to accession people from all future EU 
member states receive lower mean wages (column A), have 
worse average labor market credentials (column B), and 
most of them suffer from wage discrimination (column C). 
3 As consequence of this transformation, rounding errors occur.
Exceptions are employees from Sweden, Austria, and Fin-
land, who receive higher wages. These differences accord-
ing to nationality support findings on the “origin effect” 
of migration, particularly the positive correlation between 
immigrant wages and the level of economic development 
in the country of origin (Borjas 1987; van Tubergen et al. 
2004). More recent research emphasizes varying returns to 
education or labor market experience according to where 
it has been obtained (Dustmann et al. 2015; Sanromá et 
al. 2015). In this sense Austrians, Swedes, and Finns may 
benefit from higher returns to their human capital than 
foreigners from other EU countries. 
EU foreigners from Central and Eastern European 
countries are more disadvantaged than EU foreigners that 
joined the EU with the Southern Enlargement.  People 
from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia are the most disadvantaged groups, earning ap-
proximately half the mean German wage prior to EU ac-
cession. Although the major part of these raw wage differ-
ences can be explained by worse observed characteristics, 
some substantial wage discrimination remains (column C). 
Employees from Bulgaria and the Czech Republic suffer 
from the highest wage discrimination. Their wages are up 
to 14.0 percent lower than the wages of German employees 
with the same observed labor market characteristics. 
By contrast, the negative raw wage gaps are less pro-
nounced for employees from Greece, Portugal, and Spain 
and so is wage discrimination (3.4 % to 3.9 %). These find-
ings are in line with research on difficulties in labor mar-
ket integration for first-generation migrants from former 
guest worker countries (Kalter & Granato 2002). Remark-
ably, for nationals from these countries, wage discrimi-
nation accounts for a considerable part of the wage gap, 
i.e. wage discrimination accounts for half of the raw wage 
difference between Greeks and Germans. 
Slovaks and Slovenians are special cases. They dis-
play (in the case of Slovaks, extremely large) negative raw 
wage differentials, but they trail the German comparison 
group even more with regard to their labor market char-
acteristics. As a consequence, these groups end up with a 
wage premium of 9.7 percent for Slovaks and 2.3 percent 
for Slovenians.
(b) How do the wage differences develop after ac-
cession? Nationals from most of the EU countries benefit 
either from larger positive wage gaps (Austrians, Finns, 
Swedes) or from smaller negative wage gaps (columns A 
and G). Among the (former) disadvantaged groups of EU 
foreigners, Czechs, Estonians, Slovaks, and Spaniards 
achieve the largest improvements, with 8.3 to 13.6 per-
centage points smaller negative raw wage gaps. Improve-
ments for most nationals arise because observed labor 
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Tab. 5: Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions of the foreigner-German wage gap for full-time employed men in the West German labor market 
(full set of observed characteristics)
A B C D E F G H I J K* L M
period 1 (before accession) period 2 (2007–2010) decomposition of wage gap differences between periods
raw ex- 
plained
unex-
plained
raw ex- 
plained
unex-
plained
raw explained unexplained
∆ ∆ quantity price ∆ quantity price
First Southern Enlargement 1981 (period 1: 1980)
Greece –0.068 –0.033 –0.034 –0.215 –0.161 –0.047 –0.138 –0.124 –0.046 –0.074 –0.013 –0.002 –0.011
Morocco –0.130 –0.049 –0.077 –0.490 –0.336 –0.116 –0.318 –0.273 –0.095 –0.162 –0.036 –0.010 –0.026
Turkey –0.111 –0.088 –0.022 –0.285 –0.237 –0.039 –0.156 –0.137 –0.039 –0.094 –0.017 –0.008 –0.009
Second Southern Enlargement 1986 (period 1: 1982–1985)
Spain –0.072 –0.036 –0.034 0.027 0.009 0.019 0.092 0.043 0.044 0.000 0.051 0.048 0.003
Portugal –0.094 –0.053 –0.039 –0.238 –0.232 –0.005 –0.132 –0.169 –0.090 –0.073 0.032 0.034 –0.002
Vietnam –0.301 –0.339 0.028 –0.631 –0.333 –0.224 –0.253 0.005 0.095 –0.100 –0.259 –0.208 –0.043
Morocco –0.140 –0.066 –0.069 –0.490 –0.336 –0.116 –0.307 –0.253 –0.124 –0.114 –0.043 –0.020 –0.023
Turkey –0.149 –0.109 –0.036 –0.285 –0.237 –0.039 –0.118 –0.115 –0.045 –0.067 –0.003 0.004 –0.007
Enlargement 1995 (period 1: 1991–1994)
Finland 0.104 0.021 0.085 0.252 0.115 0.155 0.165 0.096 0.110 –0.015 0.077 0.061 0.017
Austria 0.092 0.036 0.058 0.162 0.085 0.085 0.077 0.051 0.042 0.009 0.028 0.018 0.010
Sweden 0.265 0.123 0.162 0.269 0.122 0.168 0.006 –0.001 0.013 –0.014 0.007 –0.010 0.017
USA –0.087 –0.094 0.007 0.058 0.007 0.052 0.133 0.092 0.113 –0.024 0.045 0.042 0.004
Switzerland 0.069 0.040 0.030 0.146 0.081 0.071 0.083 0.042 0.046 –0.004 0.042 0.037 0.006
Norway 0.251 0.148 0.121 0.276 0.164 0.135 0.034 0.019 0.022 –0.003 0.015 0.002 0.014
First Eastern Enlargement 2004 (period 1: 2000–2003)
Estonia –0.309 –0.294 –0.012 –0.131 –0.172 0.035 0.136 0.094 0.116 –0.025 0.046 0.045 0.001
Poland –0.516 –0.415 –0.071 –0.571 –0.535 –0.024 –0.037 –0.084 –0.060 –0.023 0.044 0.046 –0.002
Lithuania –0.425 –0.361 –0.047 –0.350 –0.336 –0.010 0.053 0.019 0.052 –0.035 0.035 0.037 –0.002
Hungary –0.264 –0.239 –0.020 –0.229 –0.236 0.005 0.028 0.003 0.026 –0.024 0.025 0.026 0.000
Latvia –0.439 –0.365 –0.054 –0.369 –0.323 –0.035 0.048 0.030 0.060 –0.032 0.018 0.021 –0.003
Czech Re. –0.514 –0.329 –0.140 –0.389 –0.230 –0.129 0.083 0.074 0.096 –0.024 0.010 0.019 –0.010
Slovakia –0.516 –0.678 0.097 –0.378 –0.452 0.051 0.091 0.135 0.163 –0.034 –0.050 –0.053 0.002
Slovenia –0.087 –0.113 0.023 –0.053 –0.071 0.017 0.031 0.037 0.045 –0.008 –0.006 –0.008 0.001
Iraq –0.957 –0.714 –0.142 –1.085 –0.685 –0.238 –0.065 0.017 0.079 –0.068 –0.083 –0.067 –0.015
Russian Fe. –0.403 –0.346 –0.043 –0.413 –0.284 –0.100 –0.007 0.046 0.081 –0.038 –0.055 –0.047 –0.007
Macedonia –0.355 –0.370 0.011 –0.369 –0.315 –0.041 –0.011 0.040 0.069 –0.031 –0.052 –0.050 –0.002
Vietnam –0.515 –0.298 –0.167 –0.631 –0.333 –0.224 –0.077 –0.027 –0.001 –0.026 –0.048 –0.034 –0.014
Morocco –0.390 –0.303 –0.067 –0.490 –0.336 –0.116 –0.072 –0.025 0.012 –0.037 –0.046 –0.038 –0.007
Ukraine –0.339 –0.272 –0.053 –0.310 –0.191 –0.100 0.022 0.064 0.095 –0.034 –0.045 –0.038 –0.007
Turkey –0.239 –0.229 –0.008 –0.285 –0.237 –0.039 –0.037 –0.006 0.015 –0.021 –0.031 –0.028 –0.002
Albania –0.496 –0.464 –0.022 –0.484 –0.423 –0.043 0.008 0.028 0.069 –0.044 –0.021 –0.018 –0.003
Croatia –0.142 –0.152 0.008 –0.145 –0.150 0.004 –0.003 0.001 0.019 –0.018 –0.004 –0.005 0.001
Bosnia-He. –0.299 –0.272 –0.021 –0.266 –0.245 –0.017 0.026 0.021 0.049 –0.029 0.005 0.006 –0.001
China –0.582 –0.357 –0.165 –0.435 –0.329 –0.080 0.093 0.021 0.042 –0.022 0.074 0.078 –0.005
Belarus –0.857 –0.351 –0.374 –0.190 –0.138 –0.046 0.359 0.157 0.181 –0.029 0.239 0.242 –0.004
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market characteristics changed to their advantage with 
sometimes substantial explained quantity effects of up to 
16.3 percentage points (column I). Improved occupational 
structures contribute substantially to smaller raw wage 
gaps for Hungarians, Latvians, Slovenians, and Spaniards. 
In contrast, cumulated experience on the German labor 
market is most important for Czechs, Estonians, Lithua-
nians, and Slovaks (appendix, Table A7). The latter refers 
to the assimilation effect that enhances human capital: 
foreigners acquire skills that are specific to the German la-
bor market, including language proficiency, which allows 
them to improve their labor market outcomes relative to 
natives (Borjas 1994; Chiswick 1978).
Spaniards stand out as the only group of EU foreigners 
that improves from a negative to a positive raw wage gap 
of 2.7 percent. In addition to more favorable educational 
and occupational structures (appendix, Table A7), this de-
velopment is driven by changes in unexplained wage gaps 
(Table 5, column K). Thus, Spaniards are the only group 
among former guest workers that catches up with and 
even overhauls Germans. This observation is in line with 
the finding that Spaniards are more similar to Germans 
than other former guest workers such as Turks and Por-
tuguese (Kalter & Granato 2002; appendix, Tables A1, A2). 
In contrast to the Spanish case, Greeks, Poles, Por-
tuguese, and Romanians suffer from larger raw wage dif-
ferences than before their accession to the EU (columns 
A and G). These results are driven by disadvantageous 
changes in observed characteristics, particularly estab-
lishment characteristics and working experience in Ger-
Tab. 5 (continued)
A B C D E F G H I J K* L M
period 1 (before accession) period 2 (2007–2010) decomposition of wage gap differences between periods
raw ex- 
plained
unex-
plained
raw ex- 
plained
unex-
plained
raw explained unexplained
∆ ∆ quantity price ∆ quantity price
Second Eastern Enlargement 2007 (period 1: 2003–2006)
Bulgaria –0.462 –0.305 –0.121 –0.441 –0.307 –0.102 0.015 –0.001 0.008 –0.010 0.016 0.024 –0.008
Romania –0.463 –0.360 –0.076 –0.665 –0.569 –0.062 –0.138 –0.153 –0.139 –0.013 0.013 0.018 –0.005
Macedonia –0.369 –0.357 –0.009 –0.369 –0.315 –0.041 0.000 0.031 0.043 –0.012 –0.032 –0.030 –0.002
Iraq –1.056 –0.710 –0.203 –1.085 –0.685 –0.238 –0.014 0.015 0.041 –0.028 –0.029 –0.017 –0.012
Turkey –0.250 –0.230 –0.017 –0.285 –0.237 –0.039 –0.027 –0.006 0.005 –0.011 –0.022 –0.020 –0.002
Vietnam –0.554 –0.295 –0.200 –0.631 –0.333 –0.224 –0.049 –0.029 –0.014 –0.014 –0.020 –0.008 –0.012
Russian Fe. –0.431 –0.325 –0.080 –0.413 –0.284 –0.100 0.013 0.031 0.049 –0.019 –0.019 –0.014 –0.004
Morocco –0.446 –0.318 –0.097 –0.490 –0.336 –0.116 –0.030 –0.013 0.005 –0.018 –0.017 –0.011 –0.006
Croatia –0.152 –0.161 0.008 –0.145 –0.150 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.018 –0.008 –0.003 –0.003 0.000
Albania –0.528 –0.460 –0.046 –0.484 –0.423 –0.043 0.029 0.026 0.046 –0.021 0.003 0.005 –0.002
Ukraine –0.370 –0.238 –0.107 –0.310 –0.191 –0.100 0.044 0.038 0.054 –0.016 0.006 0.011 –0.005
Belarus –0.295 –0.231 –0.052 –0.190 –0.138 –0.046 0.081 0.076 0.089 –0.014 0.006 0.009 –0.003
Bosnia-He. –0.307 –0.269 –0.030 –0.266 –0.245 –0.017 0.032 0.019 0.034 –0.015 0.013 0.014 –0.001
China –0.653 –0.419 –0.165 –0.435 –0.329 –0.080 0.132 0.063 0.063 0.000 0.074 0.082 –0.009
* Column K is set in italics if there was a wage premium in period 1. EU 27 countries are set in bold.
– Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decompositions are based on regressions of log daily wages that give results in log points. Results from decomposi-
tions are transformed with (exp(result)-1)(-1) for a better readability and interpretation. Rounding errors occur as a consequence. 
– Reading aid: Period 1: Greeks had a 6.8 % lower mean wage than Germans. They had a 3.3 % lower mean wage because of observed 
characteristics and a 3.4 % lower mean wage because of unobserved characteristics. The wage gap changed by 13.8 %age points to the dis-
advantage of the Greeks after accession. The wage gap changed by 12.4 %age points to their disadvantage because of the composition of 
observed characteristics and by 1.3 %age points to their disadvantage because of the composition of unobserved characteristics. Columns 
A to C show the decomposition of the wage gap immediately before the accession to the EU. Columns D to F show the decomposition of the 
wage gap at the end of the observation window. Columns G to M show the decomposition of changes in wage gaps between both periods.
– Bosnia-He.: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Czech Re.: Czech Republic, Russian Fed.: Russian Federation.
Source: administrative data from the German Institute for Employment Research: Employee History (V08.06), Benefit Receipt History SGB III 
(V6.07), Establishment History Panel (7510), own calculations
68   Stefan Bernhard, Sarah Bernhard, Do EU Anti-discrimination Provisions Make a Difference?
many (appendix, Table A7), i.e. explained quantity effects 
(-4.6 to -13.9 percentage points, Table 5, column I). In line 
with this finding, previous research (Cobb-Clark 2003) has 
determined that the labor market outcomes and charac-
teristics of migrants become less favorable when immigra-
tion laws are less restrictive or access is easier – and EU 
free movement amounts to a maximum liberalization of 
immigration laws for people from other member states.
c) We expect wage discrimination against EU foreign-
ers in Germany to be lower after their countries of origin 
joined the EU than before joining (column K). Empirically, 
there are improvements for most groups of EU foreigners 
that suffered from wage discrimination before accession. 
Of the 16 groups of EU foreigners that we include in our 
analysis, 11 exhibited wage discrimination prior to acces-
sion (Table 5, column C). Changes in wage discrimination 
for 10 out of these 11 groups of EU foreigners are in line 
with our expectations (Table 5, column K). Thus, the em-
pirical findings generally support our hypothesis. The 
trend holds for most rounds of enlargements and across 
group differences and various changes in group charac-
teristics.
Reductions in wage discrimination are strongest for 
employees from Spain, Estonia, and Poland. Spain catch-
es the eye with an improvement of 5.1 percentage points 
in their unexplained wage gap, which turns the former 
wage discrimination into a wage premium of 1.9 percent. 
Polish and Portuguese employees benefit from reductions 
in wage discrimination, too. This works against deteriora-
tions in their raw mean wage gap and the worsened com-
position of their observed labor market characteristics. In 
the cases of Estonians, Hungarians, and Spaniards, wage 
discrimination disappears completely, and the remaining 
differences in mean wages are due to various observed 
characteristics. 
Greek employees constitute the only exception be-
cause their wage discrimination increases slightly from 
3.4 percentage points before accession to 4.7 percentage 
points at the end of the observation window. Altogether, 
no country turns a wage premium into wage discrimina-
tion. There are, however, diverging developments among 
the wage premium groups of EU foreigners prior to acces-
sion. Wage premiums increase for Finns and Austrians, are 
stable for Swedes and Slovenians, but decline for Slovaks. 
(d) Wage discrimination is mitigated for almost all 
of the groups of EU foreigners after the accession of their 
home countries. To see whether this trend is specific to 
EU integration, we contrast the results of foreigners from 
EU countries with those of third-country nationals. We 
expect no or smaller reductions in wage discrimination 
for third-country nationals than for EU foreigners. Empir-
ically, with few exceptions, foreigners from EU accession 
countries do, indeed, fare better than their counterparts 
from non-accession countries. This result holds true for 
the vast majority of the comparison countries as well as 
for all rounds of accession. For example, wage discrimi-
nation against Spaniards and Portuguese is reduced over 
time, while this trend does not occur for Moroccans and 
Turks (Table 5, column K). Similarly, wage discrimination 
is ameliorated for all EU foreigners whose country of ori-
gin joined the EU during the Eastern Enlargements, while 
a comparable trend cannot be observed for foreigners 
from the vast majority of comparison countries.4 
Overall, the results support previous research that 
has emphasized the relevance of discriminatory process-
es for the labor market outcomes of migrants and ethnic 
minorities (e.g. Darity & Mason 1998). Our findings in-
dicate a lower extent of wage discrimination than found 
in quasi-experimental studies (Bertrand & Mullainathan 
2004; Kaas & Manger 2011; Midtboen 2014). This differ-
ence is most likely caused by the fact that the opportunity 
structure for wage discrimination is more susceptible to 
discriminatory preferences at the point of hiring (which 
is what quasi-experimental studies investigate) than at 
the point of wage setting (which is what we examine) (Pe-
tersen & Saporta 2004). Moreover, our focus on within-job 
wage discrimination excludes all forms of discrimination 
that allocate different groups differently into jobs and 
that value comparable jobs differently (Achatz et al. 2005; 
England et al. 2002). It is therefore likely that our findings 
mark only the tip of the iceberg and that other discrimina-
tory processes add to the disadvantages of (EU) foreigners. 
Our research is designed to capture changes in wage 
discrimination over time. In a diachronic perspective, we 
show that wage discrimination can be positively affected 
by anti-discrimination provisions and the ensuing case 
law. EU citizens enjoy special protection against discrim-
ination in other member states’ labor markets, and they 
profit from this protection, in some cases quite dramati-
cally. Studies on anti-discrimination provisions in oth-
er countries make similar observations. For example, it 
is generally acknowledged that the Civil Rights Act and 
its subsequent enforcement by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission as well as the accompanying 
4 Contrary to our hypothesis, Chinese and Belarussians benefit from 
declining wage discrimination. Table A2 in the appendix shows ex-
ceptionally high shares of academics for both groups. Chinese are 
the largest group of foreign students in Germany, mostly studying 
engineering. They possibly benefit from German immigration laws 
that allow foreign graduates from German universities to accept em-
ployment in Germany as well as from the large labor demand for en-
gineers. 
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processes of societal modernization have reduced dis-
crimination against and the segregation of women and 
ethnic minorities in the US (Darity & Mason 1998; Dono-
hue & Heckman 1991; Hirsh 2009). Nevertheless, in both 
contexts, differences in the results for the majorities and 
minorities persist, and it remains to be seen whether the 
current legal provisions and mechanisms of change will 
suffice to eventually overcome discrimination in labor 
markets.
6  Conclusion
Freedom of movement for workers in the EU is a remarka-
ble achievement of supranational integration. So far, the 
impact of EU anti-discrimination provisions in member 
states’ labor markets has been a research lacuna. Against 
this backdrop, this study used an innovative, diachron-
ic decomposition method on exceptionally rich data to 
investigate whether and to what extent EU provisions 
impact wage discrimination against male EU foreigners 
in the German labor market. The results show that wage 
discrimination on the basis of nationality negatively af-
fects wages for people from many countries of the world. 
In accordance with European regulations and intentions, 
such wage discrimination diminishes and in some cases 
and even disappears for EU foreigners. Our findings also 
show that this development is specific to EU foreigners. 
Third-country nationals are not subject to a similar overall 
trend. Thus, at least for the German case, EU integration 
proves to be a factor that restructures the processes of la-
bor market inequality.
The present study is only a starting point for research 
on the effects of EU anti-discrimination provisions on the 
free movement of workers. Further research could use al-
ternative concepts of discrimination and ask whether EU 
provisions have similar effects on evaluative and alloca-
tive discrimination (Petersen & Saporta 2004; Rissing & 
Castilla 2014). Some researchers assume that such forms 
of discrimination are, indeed, widespread (Hinz & Aus-
purg 2010) and that – because they constitute more subtle 
forms of discrimination – they may be harder to abolish 
(Petersen & Saporta 2004). A case in point is that accord-
ing to our results over time, observed characteristics pay 
off less for all foreigners (negative price effect, Table 5, 
column J). One could examine whether this result is an in-
dication of evaluative discrimination, i.e. selective depre-
ciation of labor market characteristics typical of foreign-
ers, or if other processes lie behind these developments. 
Future studies could also compare changes in discrimi-
natory practices across EU member states’ labor markets 
to identify differences and commonalities as well as the 
factors that facilitate or hamper the effectiveness of EU 
anti-discrimination provisions. Another issue worth con-
sidering is wage discrimination against female foreigners. 
Do EU anti-discrimination provisions work to their benefit 
in the same way that they do for male foreigners? How do 
processes of discrimination against foreigners intermingle 
with discrimination against women? Such studies may use 
other indicators of discrimination than wages such as seg-
regation indices (Hirsh 2009) or participation in the labor 
force (Tomaskovic-Devey & Stainback 2007).
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